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RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCIES THROUGH 
PRIVATE ORDERING 
Robert K. Rasmussen* 
There is no international bankruptcy law. No question, there are 
international insolvencies. Transnational firms, just like domestic 
ones, often cannot generate sufficient revenue to satisfy their debt ob­
ligations. Their financial distress creates a situation where assets and 
claimants are scattered across more than one country. But there is no 
international law that provides a set of rules for resolving the financial 
distress of these firms. The absence of any significant free-standing 
international bankruptcy treaty means that a domestic court con­
fronted with the domestic part of a transnational enterprise has to de­
cide which nation's domestic bankruptcy law will apply to which as­
sets. To the extent that one wants to talk about an "international 
bankruptcy law," it is nothing more than the question of when, as a 
matter of domestic law, a court will resolve a dispute according to the 
law of another country rather than its own nation's bankruptcy law. 
International bankruptcy law as it currently exists is thus, in reality, 
domestic bankruptcy law. The challenge for each nation's domestic 
law in this area is to mediate the tensions that arise because the firm 
and its creditors are spread across more than one jurisdiction. This 
question becomes difficult in large measure because each country's 
domestic bankruptcy laws diverge. Such divergence is not surprising. 
Bankruptcy laws address a myriad of discrete questions. At a mini­
mum, the bankruptcy laws of each nation must specify who will decide 
the future deployment of the insolvent firm's assets, who will own 
these assets after the proceeding ends, and who will run the firm while 
all these matters are being sorted out. Scholars exploring the best way 
to address these questions have provided a number of conceptually 
coherent theories,1 yet they have not come to a consensus on the "cor-
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. B.A. 1982, Loyola, Chicago; J.D. 1985, 
University of Chicago. - Ed. John Goldberg, Andrew Guzman, Lynn LoPucki, David 
Skeel, and Fred Tung provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this piece. I am 
also grateful to Laina Reinsmith for excellent research assistance. 
1. For an overview of the current state of bankruptcy theory, see Douglas G. Baird, 
Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998). 
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rect" bankruptcy law - and, even if they had, there is little reason to 
think that the actual political process would embrace this consensus.2 
Thus, bankruptcy laws differ across nations. We would expect 
such differences to exist even if all countries agreed that the sole pur­
pose of such laws was to resolve the problems caused by financial dis­
tress in the most efficient manner. To be a bit more concrete, perhaps 
the fundamental question confronting a bankruptcy system concerned 
with efficiency is how to determine whether a firm in financial distress 
should be liquidated or reorganized. Some domestic bankruptcy laws 
guard against inefficient attempts to keep the firm going, while others 
protect against premature liquidation.3 These countries agree that the 
goal is to promote efficiency by liquidating those firms in economic 
distress but reorganizing those that are suffering from only financial, 
as opposed to economic distress. The rub is they disagree on how to 
get there. Indeed, scholars who embrace efficiency as the sole goal of 
bankruptcy law have yet to reach consensus on the optimal bank­
ruptcy system.4 
These differences among the world's bankruptcy regimes are exac­
erbated by the fact that while any insolvency law reflects some con­
cern with efficiency, other interests, such as redistribution to favored 
groups, shape the final legislative product.5 These choices reflect dif­
ferent, often conflicting, policy judgments about which group or 
groups should be favored in the bankruptcy proceeding itself. Some 
countries provide extra protection to current employees, others to cer­
tain other creditors. Some nations treat tort victims on a par with con­
sensual unsecured creditors, and others grant them even lower prior­
ity. 
The problem that arises when a transnational firm becomes insol­
vent presents a basic choice-of-law problem: How should law recon­
cile these differing decisions? Some of these reflect differing judg-
2. For background on the political dynamics that have shaped American bankruptcy 
law, see Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 47 (1994); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of 
American Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1998); David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evo­
lutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 V AND. L. REV. 1323, 
1350-79 (1998). 
3. See Michelle J. White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S. - European 
Comparison, in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 467 
(Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996). 
4. Compare Douglas G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11 (1997) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author), with Barry Adler, Financial and Political Theories of 
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993), Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 51 (1992) 
[hereinafter Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice], and Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach 
to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALELJ. 1807 (1998). 
5. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
336 (1994); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 
437, 467-74 (1992). 
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ments as to how to implement the same goal, others stem from a dis­
agreement over the goals themselves. Commentators have proposed 
three general approaches to reconcile these conflicts: universalism, 
which comes in varying degrees;6 territorialism;7 and contractualism.8 
Universalism posits that a single country's reorganization laws 
should govern the insolvency of a transnational firm. The system de­
pends on countries agreeing to a set of choice of law rules that identify 
the "home" country of the transnational firm. The home country ad­
ministers the insolvency proceeding. Territorialism, in contrast, allows 
each country to administer the assets that it finds within its borders ac­
cording to its own domestic bankruptcy law. Finally, contractualism 
allows each independent corporate entity to specify in its corporate 
charter the jurisdiction that will handle any bankruptcy proceeding in­
volving that entity.9 The transnational firm under a bankruptcy selec­
tion regime could thus opt for a universalist approach - by having all 
of its constituent entities select the same jurisdiction to govern bank­
ruptcy proceedings - or for a territorialist approach - by having all 
of its entities select the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated. It 
could even adopt a mixed approach under which a subset of the firm's 
entities would be administered in one jurisdiction while the remainder 
would be handled where they were incorporated. 
The main justification for universalism has been an economic one. 
Its proponents, the most effective of whom have been Professors Jay 
Westbrook and Andrew Guzman, suggest that it will lead to more ef­
ficient investments and, on average, promise a greater return to the 
creditors of the insolvent firm.10 The main proponent of territorialism, 
Professor Lynn LoPucki, suggests that the economic justification of­
fered for universalism falls suspect, particularly because it is impossi-
6. A good description of these variations can be found in Lynn M. LoPucki, Coopera· 
tion in International Bankruptcy: A Post- Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 
704-06, 725-28, 732-33 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation]. 
7. See id. at 742-50. 
8. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 1, 32-35 (1997) [hereinafter Rasmussen, A New Approach]. 
9. Professor Westbrook asserts that the approach I have advocated for domestic bank­
ruptcy law - allowing firms to select reorganization regimes - devolves into nothing more 
than a security interest. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Global Solution to Multinational 
Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2303-05 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, The Global Solu­
tion]. My approach, however, allows debtors to select from competing bankruptcy systems, 
such as Chapter 11, an auction system, or state default law. Indeed, the menu I propose 
would include all those systems that could plausibly best steer a firm through financial dis­
tress. Certainly Professor Westbrook does not think that Chapter 11 is similar to a security 
interest. Thus, I fail to understand why a firm selecting a bankruptcy is a security interest; it 
certainly is not a security interest when it is imposed on firms by the state. 
10. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Trans· 
national Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775 (1999); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and 
Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law & Choice of Forums, 65 AM. BANKR. 
LJ. 457, 464-71 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism]. 
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ble to design a system that can implement universalism in a coherent 
manner.11 Professor LoPucki now endorses the holy grail of the uni­
versalists - a single law administered by a single court - but insists 
that territorialism should reign in the interregnum.12 
One could also mount a noneconomic argument against univer­
salism; namely, that it fails to respect the bankruptcy policies of the 
different countries involved. This argument relies on a principle of na­
tional self-determination and posits that each country ought to be free 
to pursue its own policies through its bankruptcy law. Any credible 
theory of how to handle transnational insolvencies must wrestle with 
the problem of comity between sovereign nations. 
Allowing firms to specify the relevant bankruptcy forum through a 
provision in their corporate charter is, like universalism, premised on 
efficiency grounds.13 The justification for the contractual approach 
begins with the assumption that some firms are better off with a terri­
torial system, others with a universalist model, still others with a mix­
ture of the two. Faced with this heterogeneity of types of firms, the 
main argument for the contractual approach is that firms ex ante, 
rather than courts ex post or legislatures ex ante, can best decide 
which regime is better for them. The one constraint on firm choice is 
that the ability to change a choice already made has to be constrained 
so as to guard against opportunistic change.14 Like universalism, how­
ever, contractualism can be subject to the twin attacks that it cannot 
be implemented in a satisfactory manner15 and that it fails to take ac­
count of comity concerns. 
This essay addresses the points of contention among these theo­
ries, and endeavors to further the debate by explaining that bank­
ruptcy selection clauses can perform better from an economic perspec­
tive than can either of its rivals, and by considering the noneconomic 
issues that some may offer as a reason to adhere to territorialism. The 
essay first examines the question, raised by Professor LoPucki, re­
garding which of the three systems promises the greatest efficiency. It 
then responds to Professor LoPucki's concern that enforcement of 
bankruptcy selection clauses would create "debtor havens" that design 
their laws so as to transfer wealth from small creditors to the debtor 
and large creditors. Finally, the essay closes by responding to the ar-
11. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 709-36. 
12 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bank-
ruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2222 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality]. 
13. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 8, at 4. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40. 
15. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 738-42. 
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gument that both universalism and the bankruptcy selection clause 
system frustrate the fulfillment of national policy.16 
I. EFFICIENCY AND TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES 
All the participants in the debate over transnational insolvencies 
claim that their approach is the most (economically) efficient. Indeed, 
to date, this is the primary claim of both the universalist and bank­
ruptcy selection clause approaches, both of which have yet to even as­
sert that they respect the noneconomic decisions reflected in domestic 
bankruptcy law.17 The exploration of the force of these efficiency 
claims, as well as of the argument that neither system can be imple­
mented in a way that would generate its purported benefits, requires 
the delineation of the theoretical arguments in favor of the universalist 
and bankruptcy selection clause approaches. Because territorialism 
has been the de facto approach to transnational insolvencies for years, 
each system starts with that baseline and attempts to demonstrate that 
a shift away from territorialism holds the promise of gains. 
It is easiest to start with universalism, which has long been the sys­
tem of choice among academics. The advocates of universalism iden­
tify two ways that a universalist system would promote greater effi­
ciency than a territorial system. First, universalism would discourage 
inefficient investment. As Professors Bebchuk and Guzman have 
pointed out, territoriality raises the possibility that a debtor will invest 
in a new country even when such an investment has a negative net 
present value.18 This result relies crucially on the premise that the new 
country will give priority to that country's creditors, who may have ex­
tended credit more recently than have creditors in another country. 
This priority accorded to the new debt effectively places some of the 
downside risk of the new project on the preexisting creditors in an­
other country. This placement of risk on the old creditors provides an 
incentive for the debtor to borrow funds from the new lender who, ex­
pecting greater bankruptcy returns from a territorialist regime, will of­
fer a lower interest rate for an investment in that country. This incen­
tive can lead a firm to invest in a country with a territorial regime even 
if an investment in a different country has a greater expected value. 
16. Professor LoPucki has made another attack on the universalist model - that no one 
has specified a workable universalist system. See id. at 709-25, 728-32, 734-36. Given that I 
reject the universalist model on other grounds, I remain agnostic on this issue. 
17. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 10, at passim (arguing for universalism on the 
ground that it would produce efficient investment incentives); Rasmussen, A New Approach, 
supra note 8, at 4; Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 10, at 464-71. Territori­
alism self-evidently respects the policy choices made by the domestic sovereign, but Profes­
sor LoPucki's defense of this system is not premised on these grounds. 
18. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 10, at 787-89. 
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Universalism combats this incentive by assuring creditors that the new 
loan will be handled under the priority scheme of the home country. 
Second, as articulated most fully by Professor Westbrook, univer­
salism encourages reorganizations that have the potential to increase 
the returns to creditors.19 It does so by combating the collective action 
problem that is the general justification for domestic corporate bank­
ruptcy law in the first instance.20 Specifically, left to their state law 
remedies of seizing assets to satisfy their debts, individual creditors 
will recognize when a debtor cannot pay off all of its debts in full, and 
each will attempt to be the first to collect on its obligation. This incen­
tive creates a race to the assets and a consequent liquidation of the 
firm. This forced liquidation may be inefficient both because the as­
sets may already be devoted to their highest valued use and because, 
even if the firm should be liquidated, an orderly liquidation process 
conducted by a single forum would bring higher returns than would a 
piecemeal liquidation conducted by disparate jurisdictions. Bank­
ruptcy law guards against this race by staying all nonbankruptcy col­
lection efforts and forcing all claimants into the single bankruptcy fo­
rum where they can, as a group, decide on the optimal deployment of 
the firm's assets. 
Professor Westbrook's justification for universalism parallels this 
argument. Absent a single proceeding, creditors in each country 
would have an incentive to grab the assets in that country. A world­
wide reorganization of a transnational firm, according to the advocates 
of universalism, would increase the value of the firm's assets. Univer­
salism, just like domestic bankruptcy law, also promises savings by de­
creasing the number of forums that would be needed to resolve a 
firm's financial distress. 
The theoretical arguments behind these purported gains are clear; 
the extent to which any of these gains exist as a practical matter, how­
ever, remains unclear. As to investment incentives, Bebchuk and 
Guzman correctly identify a theoretical problem with the territorial 
approach, but they fail to offer a convincing explanation as to why the 
contracting parties cannot eliminate most of the problem through con­
tract.21 Bankruptcy law, by specifying the distribution of an insolvent 
firm's assets, affects the selection of a firm's investments.22 Professors 
19. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 10, at 465-66. 
20. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19 
(1986). 
21. Also, their argument best justifies treating foreign creditors the same as national 
creditors (so-called "national treatment"), a practice that almost all countries already follow. 
See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 8, at 29. 
22 See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 473-
75 (1992); Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1995); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Re-
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Bebchuk and Guzman demonstrate how later lending can reduce the 
expected return to the earlier creditor. In their model, a country fol­
lows territorialism when it grants priority to creditors from that coun­
try.23 This granting of priority has the effect of placing the risk of fail­
ure of the new investment on the old creditors. If there are not 
sufficient assets to pay all claims, domestic creditors get paid first. The 
earlier creditor, of course, can anticipate this treatment, and price its 
loan accordingly. The debtor still pays the same overall rate of inter­
est - it is just that the earlier creditors charge a higher rate than they 
otherwise would, and the later creditors a lower one. 
The cost of this adjustment of interest rates induced by territorial­
ism is that it creates an incentive to invest in the country that follows 
territorialism in order to obtain the lower rate of interest. In other 
words, firms would not select investments solely based on their ex­
pected returns. 
Viewed ex ante, debtors bear the cost of not investing in the most 
promising projects. They thus would have an incentive to commit to 
not engaging in this behavior. They would want to commit to invest­
ing in projects that offer the greatest expected return. 
Loan covenants in the original loan agreement could go a long way 
toward this result. For example, a lending agreement could define, as 
a default, any attempt to procure credit from abroad on terms that 
would give the subsequent lender priority. The problem hypothesized 
by Professors Bebchuk and Guzman is simply a variant of the problem 
that arises whenever a firm with existing debt issues senior debt. 
Lenders routinely insist on covenants to guard against this action.24 
Indeed, taking a security interest is one mechanism for preventing the 
priming of preexisting debt.25 Another mechanism is the negative 
pledge clause, which prevents the debtor from incurring senior debt 
without the permission of the earlier lender.26 
To be sure, as Professors Bebchuk and Guzman argue,27 contrac­
tual solutions cannot eliminate totally the adverse incentive effects of 
territorialism. Requiring creditor approval of foreign investments may 
eliminate the risk of debtor opportunism but create the risk of creditor 
opportunism. In cases where foreign investment is optimal, old credi­
tors may insist on part of the gains in exchange for their consent. 
form on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994); Alan Schwartz, The Abso/llte 
Priority Rule and the Firm's Investment Policy, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213 (1994). 
23. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 10, at 788-89. 
24. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 216-18 
(1989). 
25. See id. at 228-34; George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect 
Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 236 (1992). 
26. See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 216-18. 
27. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 10, at 800-02. 
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Creditor opportunism may be constrained by a creditor's desire to fos­
ter a reputation for fair dealing with its borrowers and by the debtor's 
ability to make alternative investments that do not require creditor 
approval. Indeed, one observes the use of negative-pledge clauses de­
spite the fact that they create the risk of opportunistic behavior by the 
lender. Thus, contracts can limit the adverse incentive effects gener­
ated by territorialism. 
Stated differently, for the proponents of universalism to assert that 
universalism will create better investment incentives, they must show 
that territorialism generates inefficiencies that cannot be reduced 
drastically through the adroit use of contract. After all, as Bebchuk 
and Guzman recognize, creditors can price inefficient lending terms.28 
Since debtors have the incentive to borrow money at the lowest rate 
possible, they have the incentive to offer contracts that maximize the 
contracting surplus between the contracting parties.29 
If universalism cannot be justified entirely by the creation of supe­
rior investment incentives, it must find justification on the grounds 
that it will lead to a greater return to creditors through either global 
reorganizations or coordinated liquidations. In a transnational corpo­
rate structure, one can easily envision firms that could be handled 
most efficiently on a country-by-country basis.3° Firms with global op­
erations typically establish legally distinct companies in each country 
in which they do significant business. This global segmentation pro­
vides each country with a discrete firm to focus on. On the one hand, 
there may be firms that experience financial, but not economic, dis­
tress, and whose constituent parts are so well integrated that any suc­
cessful reorganization will need the active cooperation of all countries 
in which the firm has an affiliate. On the other hand, some firms may 
yield a higher return when administered on a territorial basis. 
Stated somewhat differently, the universalist concern that the inef­
ficient domestic race to the assets will reoccur at the international 
level rests on a flawed analogy. Each nation already has in place a 
domestic bankruptcy system that prevents a destructive race to the as­
sets located in that jurisdiction. For the analogy to carry through, the 
transnational firm has to generate excess value from the combination 
of its constituent members. In a world where we routinely see firms 
changing business strategy and selling off subsidiaries, it is, at the least, 
not obvious that such a relationship exists for a substantial number of 
firms. 
28. See id. at 803. 
29. See Frank H. Easterbrook, ls Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 
414 (1990); Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 4, at 56-59; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 
1812-14. 
30. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 8, at 27-32; LoPucki, Cooperation, su­
pra note 6, at 742-59. 
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The universalist claim rests on the assumption that for transna­
tional firms, integration of their world-wide operations is more com­
mon than having its constituent parts run as individual entities. This 
claim alone is not necessarily false (although conceivably it could be). 
But clearly not all firms would benefit from a universalist system. The 
advantage of the bankruptcy selection clause approach is that it allows 
firms to sort themselves. Firms that would benefit from a single reor­
ganization proceeding can place a term in the corporate charter of 
each affiliate specifying which nation will adjudicate any insolvency 
proceeding involving the firm. Firms with discrete operations can con­
tract for a territorial approach by specifying in each corporate charter 
that the country of incorporation will handle any bankruptcy situation 
that may arise. Indeed, some transnational firms may well have some 
constituent parts that form part of an integrated world-wide operation 
and some that do not. In such a case, the integrated entities could 
each select the same jurisdiction to handle an insolvency while having 
the remaining entities select the nation in which they are incorporated. 
In other words, the bankruptcy selection clause approach allows firms 
to tailor the transnational insolvency system to best meet their par­
ticular needs. As such, it provides more gains than either universalism 
or territorialism. 
Another cost of universalism that has yet to be recognized in the 
literature relates to the interaction between bankruptcy law and gen­
eral corporate law. Often a nation's general corporate law works in 
tandem with its bankruptcy law. For example, the American corpo­
rate governance/bankruptcy system relies on what Professor David 
Skeel has termed "ex post" correctives of managerial failure, whereas 
the German and Japanese systems rely on "ex ante" correctives.31 The 
details of the argument are not important for present purposes. What 
is important is the general insight that a nation's corporate law and 
bankruptcy law work together. Universalism threatens to destroy the 
symmetry of these systems by superimposing a bankruptcy regime 
premised on one type of corporate governance system onto a different 
corporate governance system. By disrupting the harmony that would 
otherwise exist between bankruptcy and corporate law, universalism 
threatens the system of laws that nations have developed to police 
firm performance. 
Bankruptcy selection clauses, unlike universalism, respect the inte­
grated nature of corporate law and bankruptcy law. Firms can ensure 
that the bankruptcy regime they select comports with the governing 
corporate law. Selecting a bankruptcy law from another country does 
not necessarily lessen the interactive effect of bankruptcy law and cor­
porate law. Only selecting incompatible bankruptcy laws results in 
31. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 1328. 
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this harm. To the extent that compatible bankruptcy and corporate 
laws increase firm value, bankruptcy selection clauses will tend to 
maintain the balance between the two systems. 
Professor LoPucki raises yet another concern, which applies to 
both the universalist and bankruptcy selection clause approaches. He 
argues that the informational demands that these systems place on 
creditors overwhelm any potential gains. Creditors who wish to price 
all relevant terms of the loan will have to ascertain which law will gov­
ern the insolvency of the firm. In the case of universalism, the credi­
tors will have to ascertain the "home" country, and then plumb its 
bankruptcy law. In a world where courts enforce bankruptcy selection 
clauses, the creditors will have to look at the corporate charter, figure 
out which jurisdiction has been selected, and then delve into the intri­
cacies of that nation's insolvency law.32 
Professor LoPucki raises a valid point; universalism and bank­
ruptcy clause selection would increase the cost of drafting initial 
lending agreements, especially for those lenders who lend solely to 
domestic firms. To conclude that these costs justify abandoning either 
of the proposed alternatives to territorialism, however, requires a 
finding that these costs exceed the benefits offered by each system. 
Professors Guzman and Westbrook have responded to Professor 
LoPucki on behalf of the universalists.33 
As to the bankruptcy selection clause approach, Professor 
Westbrook joins Professor LoPucki in asserting that the information 
demands of the system would rob it of any potential benefit.34 The 
question of whether high information costs will swamp any potential 
benefits boils down to one of intuition. My own sense is that Profes­
sors LoPucki and Westbrook drastically overstate the costs of con­
tracting. It will not be difficult to determine, under a bankruptcy se­
lection clause system, what jurisdiction has been selected to administer 
a firm's bankruptcy. The firm borrowing the money will simply show 
the lender the relevant provision in its corporate charter. 
32 See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 738-39. 
33. See Andrew T. Guzman, In Defense of Universalism in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2177 (2000); Westbrook, The Global Solution, supra note 9, at 2307-25. 
34. Both Professor LoPucki and Professor Westbrook trot out the claim that the bank­
ruptcy selection clause approach relies on the assumption of perfect markets with zero tran­
saction costs. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 12, at 2242; Westbrook, 
The Global Solution, supra note 9, at 2302-03. As should be clear by now, there is no such 
reliance. Rather, the claim is that, including transaction costs, efficiency is improved 
through firm selection rather than government fiat. See generally James W. Bowers, The 
Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost School of Bankruptcy Theory: A Com­
ment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1773 (1993); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Eco­
nomic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 110-15 
(1995) (considering various impediments to implementing a selection regime); Rasmussen, A 
New Approach, supra note 8, at 20-26 (similar). 
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The largest potential cost is getting a handle on the law of the 
country selected. This cost, of course, will only be relevant when firms 
have selected jurisdictions other than the one in which they are lo­
cated. Even for these firms, this cost may not loom large. It is, of 
course, difficult to predict with certainty what selection patterns would 
emerge in a regime of bankruptcy selection clauses. We currently live 
in a world of mandated bankruptcy regimes, and thus we have no de­
finitive evidence of how firms would act were they granted the free­
dom to select the governing bankruptcy law. 
Yet it is quite possible that a certain, small number of nations 
could end up being viewed as having the "best" bankruptcy law. In­
deed, such a situation could develop precisely because of the inf orma­
tional concerns expressed by Professor LoPucki. Debtors, to the ex­
tent that they are dealing with fully adjusting creditors, will bear the 
costs that the creditors will incur when they investigate the bankruptcy 
jurisdiction that the debtor has selected. Debtors thus have an incen­
tive to keep these costs to a minimum. Once lenders become familiar 
with the workings of a few countries' bankruptcy laws, debtors will 
have an incentive to select either the law of their home jurisdiction or 
one of these well-known laws so as to hold down their cost of credit.35 
Indeed, similar potential information problems exist today in re­
lated legal areas, and firms have been able to cope with these prob­
lems in a satisfactory manner. For example, although American cor­
porations can incorporate in any one of fifty states, the system has not 
been bogged down in an informational quagmire. First, most corpora­
tions incorporate either in their home state or in Delaware.36 Thus, 
lenders that lend only to local businesses need only be familiar with 
their own state's corporate code and that of Delaware. Large credi­
tors, in contrast, will lend to a number of firms that are governed by a 
number of different corporation codes. Despite these myriad sources 
of law and the potential informational problems that in theory could 
arise, things work pretty well. Indeed, a recent study has confirmed 
that Delaware corporations, on average, have a higher value than do 
corporations from other states.37 In other words, firms have focused 
on a single jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction appears to be the one that 
maximizes firm value. 
35. For a discussion of the possible network effects that might lead to adoption of a sin­
gle state's law, see Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Con­
tracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). 
36. See Robert Daines, How Firms Choose Domicile: Some Evidence on State Compe­
tition and the Demand for Corporate Law (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). 
37. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? (2000) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author). 
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A second example that suggests that informational problems may 
not be debilitating is the general enforceability of forum-selection 
clauses and choice-of-law clauses. In the international context, these 
provisions are routinely enforced. This enforcement raises the exact 
same theoretical problems that Professors LoPucki and Westbrook 
raise in regard to bankruptcy selection clauses. Despite these theo­
retical problems, choice of law scholars generally endorse the prevail­
ing practice.38 Thus, while there exists no guarantee that the gains of a 
bankruptcy selection regime would not be overwhelmed by informa­
tion costs, private selection has increased efficiency in situations that 
appear roughly similar. 
Professor LoPucki also argues that information costs regarding 
changes in a firm's selection will be large. Extant practices in corpo­
rate law generally belie this assertion as well. Not surprisingly, firms 
change both the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated and the 
provisions of their charter with some frequency. These changes have 
not frustrated the operations of the securities markets. Thus, one 
should be suspicious of the assertion that the information costs of 
changing the bankruptcy selection will be prohibitive. Indeed, a sim­
ple solution exists. Creditors in their lending agreements can require 
that they be informed of changes in the bankruptcy selection. 
To be sure, there are transaction costs associated with bankruptcy 
selection clauses. Yet that is true of all proposals in this area. Profes­
sor LoPucki's cooperative territorialism has such costs as well. He en­
visions extensive negotiations after insolvency among the various ju­
risdictions that have control over portions of the multinational 
enterprise. While Professor LoPucki elides over the point, these nego­
tiations would be expensive. Moreover, one can imagine that in at 
least some instances the negotiations could end in an impasse. Con­
stituent parts of a corporate enterprise that should be reorganized as a 
single entity may be liquidated individually. Conversely, jurisdictions 
may agree to cooperate where separate administration would promise 
a larger return to the creditors. Parties beforehand may thus have dif­
ficulty predicting the outcome of future negotiations. All this suggests 
that the costs of cooperative territorialism may well exceed those of a 
bankruptcy selection clause regime. 
Professor Guzman raises a final concern with bankruptcy selection 
clauses. He notes that domestic bankruptcy law does not allow for 
firm choice. Thus, creditors anticipate that their claims will be re­
solved by domestic bankruptcy law. Once the firm becomes multina-
38. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consen­
sual Adjudicating Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988); Michael E. 
Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L 
L.J. 51 (1992). 
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tional, however, these expectations would be defeated. The ability to 
defeat these expectations would, in tum, distort investment choices. 
The optimal solution, as recognized by Professor Guzman, would 
be to extend a choice-based regime to domestic law. Failing this, the 
appropriate response is a system of constraints on how a charter can 
be changed. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere,39 a system that pro­
vides for firm choice has to allow for needed change while at the same 
time restrict opportunistic amendment. Two solutions come readily to 
mind, and there probably are others as well. First, one can require a 
lag time between when an amendment is made and when it becomes 
effective. This simple rule guards against selection changes driven by 
imminent financial distress. Second, creditors can put a term in their 
lending agreement declaring changes to be a default. This term would 
give the lender the opportunity to terminate or renegotiate its rela­
tionship with the debtor if it believes that the change adversely affects 
its loan.40 These constraints would ensure that changes in the govern­
ing bankruptcy selection would enhance efficiency. 
In sum, a regime in which bankruptcy selection clauses are rou­
tinely enforced should perform better than one based on either uni­
versalism or territorialism. 
II. THE ILLUSIVE PROBLEM OF DEBTOR HA YENS 
Two other objections can be leveled against a regime of bank­
ruptcy selection clauses. The first is that such a regime would create 
an incentive for some jurisdictions to become "debtor havens." The 
second is that it will allow firms to undo noneconomic policy choices 
made by the appropriate domestic government. This section ad­
dresses the first of these concerns. 
Professor LoPucki has raised the specter that an international legal 
system that routinely enforces bankruptcy selection clauses will create 
"debtor havens."41 The term implies derision, but to assess the merits 
of this criticism one must articulate exactly what a debtor's haven 
would be. Such a haven must have the attribute that it transfers value 
from creditors to debtors. To adumbrate the scope of this concern, it 
is useful to employ Professor Guzman's distinction among fully ad­
justing, weakly nonadjusting, and strongly nonadjusting creditors.42 
This classification helps isolate which creditors - if any - can sys-
39. See Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 4, at 116-21; Rasmussen & Skeel, supra 
note 34, at 113-15. 
40. See generally George G. Triantis & Ronald T. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interac­
tive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995) (explaining the role of covenants in 
lending agreements). 
41. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 739. 
42 See Guzman, supra note 33, at 2180-81, 2182. 
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tematically be disadvantaged in a way that would spur the creation of 
debtor's havens. 
The first category of creditors - fully adjusting creditors - cannot 
be systematically shortchanged via a bankruptcy selection clause. 
These creditors price their transactions such that each transaction of­
fers, ex ante, a market rate of return. Any attempt to select a bank­
ruptcy regime that transferred money to the debtor from these credi­
tors after the filing of a bankruptcy petition would result in an 
offsetting transfer to these creditors from the debtor at the time they 
agreed to the transaction. To the extent that fully adjusting creditors 
affect the analysis at all, their existence would lead the debtor to select 
the efficient bankruptcy regime so that it would reduce its cost of 
credit. 
To the extent that the problem of debtor's havens exists, it must 
revolve round the ability of debtors (with the aid of a facilitating coun­
try)43 to exploit systematically either weakly nonadjusting creditors or 
strongly nonadjusting creditors or both. The distinction between these 
two types of creditors captures the fact that some creditors, while not 
adjusting the individual rate of interest they charge to debtors, none­
theless can adjust their overall interest rate so as to earn a competitive 
rate of return; other creditors, in contrast, cannot change their lending 
pattern to respond to any change in bankruptcy policy. 
Professor Guzman quite rightly notes that for weakly nonadjusting 
creditors there is a subsidization from low-risk debtors to high-risk 
debtors.44 The basic insight here is that since all debtors are charged 
the same interest rate that reflects a blend of the riskiness of the entire 
borrowing pool, those debtors with a lower risk of default than the 
blended average pay a higher rate of interest than they would if the 
interest rate were based on an individualized determination. Con­
versely, those debtors with a higher risk of default pay a lower rate 
than they otherwise would. Professor Guzman also demonstrates that 
weakly nonadjusting creditors cannot be systematically disadvantaged 
by any given bankruptcy regime. Regardless of the regime, they will 
be able to price their loans so as to obtain a market rate of return. 
43. LoPucki has not articulated the reasons why nations may tailor their law to attract 
debtors to select them as the situs of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the case of domestic cor­
porations law, theorists have identified ways in which Delaware has committed itself to pro­
viding the law that corporations desire. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 37-44 (1993); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory 
of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927, 1939-45 (1998); 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward An Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 469, 490 (1987); see also Robert K. Rasmussen & Randal 
S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (explaining how competition among bankruptcy judges for 
desirable cases may affect their handling of cases). Indeed, if a country benefits by having a 
firm select it as the site of its bankruptcy, the race would be to the top. As the text explains, 
firms, on balance, would benefit from selecting the most efficient bankruptcy regime. 
44. See Guzman, supra note 33, at 2187-88. 
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To say that these creditors are not systematically disadvantaged 
does not mean that debtors will necessarily select the regime that 
would most advance social welfare. This divergence between private 
incentives and the public good may arise due to a collective action 
problem. Debtors, as a group, would benefit from the selection of a 
bankruptcy regime that lowered the overall price of credit. Each 
debtor, however, would have the individual incentive to select a re­
gime that distributed value from weakly nonadjusting creditors to the 
debtor. This incentive arises because the debtor does not bear the full 
cost of its actions, a situation that does not present itself when the 
debtor deals with a fully adjusting creditor. When borrowing funds 
from a weakly nonadjusting creditor, the debtor that has selected a 
bankruptcy regime that, ex post, transfers value from the creditor to 
the debtor gains the entire value that it appropriates from the weakly 
nonadjusting creditor. At the same time, its own decision does not no­
ticeably affect the rate of interest that the weakly nonadjusting credi­
tor charges. To be sure, in the aggregate, the decisions of all debtors 
will affect the rate of interest, but no single debtor will view its deci­
sion as affecting that rate. Thus, the dominant strategy for all debtors 
is to select a bankruptcy regime that transfers value to debtors from 
weakly nonadjusting creditors. The optimal regime for an individual 
debtor thus does not transfer value from a fully adjusting creditor, but 
does expropriate value from weakly adjusting creditors. 
As with the informational overload problem identified by Profes­
sor LoPucki, one must try to gauge the magnitude of this problem. As 
the adage goes "My theory beats your practice." Thus, to make a 
valid assessment of the competing proposals, one needs some sense as 
to how many weakly nonadjusting creditors exist and how easy it is to 
craft a bankruptcy regime that transfers value from them to the 
debtor. While it is difficult to ascertain the number of such creditors 
today, one would expect the category of weakly nonadjusting creditors 
to shrink dramatically in the future. A rational creditor is weakly 
nonadjusting when the cost of making individualized credit determina­
tions exceeds the benefits of such a determination, and recent devel­
opments in credit markets have made such determinations easier to 
make. First, transnational firms tend to be large firms, and there is a 
wealth of data available on such firms at a low cost. For example, 
creditors can readily obtain information on such firms from services 
such as Dun & Bradstreet. Other innovations include credit scoring, 
which allows a lender to process a loan application in a matter of min­
utes.45 Indeed, the entire thrust of recent developments in private 
markets is the steady decrease of the costs of obtaining and processing 
45. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 30-34 (1997). 
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information.46 As creditors can obtain information at lower costs, they 
gain the incentive to become fully adjusting. 
Competition forces creditors to become fully adjusting when it is 
cost justified to do so. A competing creditor who can identify low-risk 
debtors can offer those debtors a lower interest rate than can a weakly 
adjusting creditor. Creditors make money by extending credit, and 
thus seek out potential lending opportunities. To be sure, competition 
may not drive all creditors to become fully adjusting. There may be a 
residual class of debtors for whom it is not cost justified to offer credit 
terms on an individualized basis. Nevertheless, as the amount of a 
debtor's debt held by fully adjusting creditors increases, the debtor's 
incentive to make the most efficient bankruptcy selection increases as 
well. 
Added to the uncertainty as to the number of weakly nonadjusting 
creditors in the transnational context is the difficulty involved for a 
bankruptcy regime to target such creditors for expropriation. Bank­
ruptcy laws tend to distinguish between secured creditors and unse­
cured creditors, but this distinction does not map onto the distinction 
between fully adjusting and weakly nonadjusting creditors. Some se­
cured creditors, such as those who take a security interest in the goods 
that they sell, may be weakly nonadjusting. Some unsecured creditors, 
such as financial institutions making operating loans, may be fully ad­
justing. Thus, even if the amount of weakly nonadjusting creditors is 
large, it is far from certain that bankruptcy laws can be targeted so as 
to transfer value from weakly adjusting creditors to debtors on the one 
hand, while at the same time not to transfer such value from fully ad­
justing creditors on the other. To the extent that a bankruptcy system 
inefficiently attempts to transfer value away from fully adjusting credi­
tors, the debtor will pay the cost of this inefficiency. 
In light of these observations, the concern over debtor havens must 
be a concern about the exploitation of strongly nonadjusting creditors. 
These are creditors for whom changes in the applicable legal rules do 
not alter their pricing behavior. Professor Guzman treats the govern­
ment as a strongly nonadjusting creditor,47 but such treatment seems 
inappropriate. Governments charge an interest rate on their "loan," 
and they set this rate by statute.48 To be sure, institutional reasons 
may exist that explain why the selected rate does not ensure a market 
rate of return, but it is these institutional reasons, and not the lack of 
46. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 
2225 {1999). 
47. See Guzman, supra note 33, at 2183. Professor Guzman recognizes, however, that 
his classification of the government as a strongly nonadjusting creditor is debatable. See id. 
at 2183 n.28. 
48. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 660l{a) (assessing interest on late taxes) & 662l{a) (setting 
rate at federal short-term rate plus 3%). 
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an ability to set an appropriate interest rate, that ensures that the gov­
ernment is not fully compensated. In other words, governments 
clearly have the ability to set a fully compensatory rate of interest, and 
thus they should not be considered strongly nonadjusting creditors. 
The one group of true strongly nonadjusting creditors is tort vic­
tims. The concern raised by Professor LoPucki over how this group 
would fare under a legal system that routinely enforces bankruptcy 
selection clauses presents the most formidable objection to the imple­
mentation of a regime based on private ordering. Professor LoPucki 
asserts that a system of bankruptcy selection clauses would worsen the 
plight of tort victims because debtors will systematically select jurisdic­
tions that provide the worse possible treatment of such claims.49 He 
identifies six possible ways in which tort creditors may be disadvan­
taged in a bankruptcy clause selection regime. First, they may receive 
a lower priority than they would in a territorial system. This would 
occur where debtors select forums that accord lower priority to tort 
claims than does the forum that would otherwise administer the bank­
ruptcy proceeding. Second, Professor LoPucki suggests that tort 
creditors may face a greater inconvenience when seeking recovery on 
their claims because debtors will select jurisdictions that make it more 
inconvenient to pursue one's claim. These two arguments relate to the 
selected jurisdiction's bankruptcy law's treatment of tort creditors. 
Professor LoPucki's other four reasons for concluding that a bank­
ruptcy clause selection regime would lead to an increase in the amount 
of torts committed - firms would select nations that give low verdicts, 
that have substantive tort law that disfavors tort victims, that have 
procedural impediments to tort claimants, and that do not have a suf­
ficient number of plaintiffs' attorneys - all relate to the contours of 
the selected country's tort law system. 
Professor LoPucki's first assertion, that debtors will use bank­
ruptcy selection clauses to strategically reduce the value of the claims 
of tort creditors, implicitly relies on the assumption that such manipu­
lation carries with it the possibility of substantial gains to the debtor. 
This assumption is difficult to justify. To see why, one must begin with 
the extant treatment of tort creditors. American law both provides for 
limited liability and accords tort claims priority status equal to that of 
consensual unsecured debt. Academics agree that such treatment falls 
short of the ideal.5° From an efficiency perspective, law and economics 
scholars agree that, to the extent that firms do not internalize the full 
49. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1896· 
902 (1994). 
50. See, e.g., id. at 1898-99; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case 
for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857, 882-83 (1996). 
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cost of potential torts, they have too little incentive to take care.51 
Those who view fairness as the overriding normative goal of bank­
ruptcy similarly conclude that tort victims should receive better treat­
ment than they currently do.52 The relevant question for the debate 
over transnational insolvencies is whether a bankruptcy selection 
clause regime would exacerbate the problems inherent in existing law. 
As an initial matter, it may be that few transnational firms would 
focus on potential tort liability at all. Each firm differs in the potential 
that it has for inflicting uncompensated injury on third parties. In 
most situations, firms will have insurance sufficient to cover the claims 
of the few tort victims it may have.53 When a firm files for bankruptcy, 
the proceeds of insurance policies go directly to the injured claimants, 
despite their nominal status as unsecured creditors.54 Thus, when ade­
quate insurance exists, tort creditors are compensated in full despite 
the nominal low priority that their claims receive in bankruptcy. 
There certainly will be cases where a firm engages in activities that 
carry the potential to create tort claims that exceed the combination of 
their equity and their insurance coverage. It is this subset of firms that 
must form the basis for Professor LoPucki's fear. Yet the room for 
strategic manipulation of bankruptcy law to inflict loss on this group is 
quite small. I am unaware of any country that follows the prescription 
of most scholars and grants tort creditors priority over the consensual 
creditors of the firm; at best, nations allow tort creditors to share pro 
rata with unsecured creditors; at worst, they place tort creditors below 
unsecured creditors. In other words, to say that there is a problem 
with firms opportunistically selecting bankruptcy jurisdictions based 
on the differing treatment accorded to tort creditors, one has to iden­
tify jurisdictions that accord different treatment to tort creditors. It 
would make little sense for debtors to flee to a foreign jurisdiction to 
ensure that tort creditors have a low priority when they are already 
accorded such treatment at home.55 
51. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811, 826 (1994); 
F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1415-19 (1986); David 
W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1643-
49 (1991). 
52. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of 
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 541, 569 (1993); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy­
making in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 354 (1993); see also Robert K. 
Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1, 31-35 (arguing that a Rawlsian legislature would accord better treatment to tort creditors 
than does current law). 
53. See James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's 
The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1380-88 (1998). 
54. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 378 (1988). 
55. To the extent that a government does decide to accord its tort victinls better treat­
ment than currently exists, it can ensure that this priority is respected by granting these vic­
tims a property right in the firm's assets. See infra Part III. 
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To be sure, Professor LoPucki has identified jurisdictions that treat 
tort claimants even worse than does American law.56 Yet, the effect of 
the marginal lowering in priority between the United States and these 
other countries will not likely be great. Professors Bebchuk and Fried, 
echoing claims made by Professor LoPucki, have argued that a firm's 
ability to issue secured debt can lead to a lowering of precaution. This 
decrease in the level of precaution is in addition to the decrease 
caused by limited liability.57 The linchpin of the argument is that by 
ensuring that the secured creditor can take all of the remaining assets 
of the firm, regardless of whether the firm takes cost-justified precau­
tions, the firm will pay a lower rate of interest. This lower rate of in­
terest results because priority ensures that when a firm becomes insol­
vent, the remaining assets go to the secured lender and are not shared 
with the tort claimants. If the secured creditor had to share the assets 
with tort creditors, it would have to compensate for this loss by 
charging a higher rate of interest initially. 
Translating this argument to the context of transnational insolven­
cies takes something of an effort. As an initial matter, Professors 
Bebchuk and Fried were careful not to claim that the distortion they 
find caused by secured credit in the domestic context is a large one.58 
When one runs through the argument in the context of transnational 
insolvencies where the shift is between unsecured creditors and tort 
claimants, any distortion becomes smaller still. The economic argu­
ment for territorialism based on preserving tort creditor priority would 
start with the observation that American law requires tort creditors to 
share on a pro rata basis with unsecured creditors. Unsecured credi­
tors, be they fully adjusting or weakly nonadjusting, would charge a 
higher rate of interest than they would if they had priority over the 
tort claims. This higher rate of interest would reflect the fact that they 
would have to share the unencumbered assets of the firm with tort 
claimants. Debtors could reduce this cost by selecting a jurisdiction 
that placed tort creditors below consensual claimants. 
Such reduction, however, is only partial. Initially, it is unclear, on 
average, the extent to which assets are even available for distribution 
to any unsecured. Thus, there may be limited room to maneuver in 
this area. Moreover, the debtor would not achieve the full benefit of 
any maneuvering in which it engaged. Only fully adjusting unsecured 
creditors would take account of the debtor's selected bankruptcy ju­
risdiction when making their lending decisions. Partially adjusting un­
secured creditors, by definition, would not react to a debtor's selection 
56. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at nn.61-63. 
57. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 50, at 898-900. 
58. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Se­
cured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
1279, 1320 {1997). 
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of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent that a debtor will select 
a jurisdiction so as to lower the priority of tort claims, it has to be the 
case that the debtor expects to gain in its dealings with fully adjusting 
unsecured creditors. 
Yet this state of affairs raises a puzzle: If a fully adjusting unse­
cured creditor is willing to confer an advantage on a debtor in ex­
change for having priority over tort victims, then why does it not sim­
ply become a secured creditor and get that same advantage? In other 
words, for Professor LoPucki's concern to be valid, it must be the case 
that the cost of becoming a secured creditor exceeds the cost of 
learning about a bankruptcy regime selected by the debtor. Given 
that the cost of becoming a secured creditor is not excessive,59 it is 
hard to imagine a debtor selecting a bankruptcy jurisdiction simply to 
move tort claims further down the priority ladder. 
Even if one could identify a benefit that a debtor could obtain 
through priority dilution that it could not otherwise get, it is still far 
from certain that debtors would grab this benefit. The priority dilu­
tion that Professor LoPucki identifies forms only a small part of the 
selected country's bankruptcy law. The efficacy of the remaining law 
will more likely drive the selection choice. The benefits that can be 
achieved by selecting the most efficient insolvency law will most likely 
far exceed any benefits that could be garnered by subrogating the 
claims of tort victims. The savings promised by selecting the most effi­
cient regime obtain in every insolvency case; the gains generated by 
lowering priority only occur in cases with substantial tort liability, 
which are infrequent. Thus, one would expect that debtors would be 
more concerned with selecting an efficacious bankruptcy law than they 
would be with lowering tort creditor priority. 
Despite the unlikely event that a debtor will select a bankruptcy 
jurisdiction simply in order to lower the priority of tort claims, I still 
endorse a requirement that any bankruptcy regime selected by a firm 
accord at least nominal priority to tort victims similar to what they 
achieve in their home country.6() This endorsement, while not central 
to the entire bankruptcy selection scheme, flows from efficiency con­
cerns.61 As Professor LoPucki notes, in theory this requirement may 
prevent some firms from selecting a jurisdiction because it places tort 
creditors in a lower position than they would be under the law of their 
home country. Yet, once lawyers and judges in a country became 
aware that their country was not being selected solely because of its 
59. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
625, 658-68 (1997). 
60. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 8, at 35. 
61. It is also the case that lowering the priority of tort victims would strike many as un­
fair. To the extent that this a salient concern, my requirement that the country selected not 
lower the priority of tort creditors would respond to this concern. 
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shoddy treatment of tort creditors, these actors would have to attempt 
to have the country change its laws so as to raise the priority of tort 
claims. Given that all seem to decry placing tort creditors near the 
bottom of a firm's capital structure, such an incentive should be ap­
plauded. 
Professor LoPucki also posits, in his second assertion, that firms 
would select jurisdictions simply to make it difficult for tort victims to 
pursue their claims. The easy response to this supposition is that this 
strategy would impose greater costs on the debtor than it would on the 
putative tort claimants. This response stems from the fact that if the 
firm files for bankruptcy, it must deal with this jurisdiction. It is hard 
to see how a jurisdiction could be inconvenient for the tort creditors, 
but not the firm and its managers as well. Also, the selected jurisdic­
tion would probably be inconvenient for the firm's fully adjusting 
creditors. The debtor thus would bear the full cost of its own incon­
venience, plus, indirectly, the costs that the choice imposed on the 
fully adjusting creditors. Thus, inconvenience is a two-edged sword. 
Given that in most bankruptcy cases there are far more attorneys for 
debtors and consensual creditors than there are for tort victims, it 
seems fanciful to suggest that firms would put themselves and all oth­
ers to such inconvenience just to ensure that, should any tort creditors 
arise, they would find it inconvenient as well. 
The remaining four problems identified by Professor LoPucki all 
involve situations where the jurisdiction in which the firm commits to 
file its bankruptcy also has a tort system that is less hospitable to tort 
claimants than is the firm's home jurisdiction. Again, it is far from 
clear the extent to which this possibility is a substantial obstacle to im­
plementing a bankruptcy clause selection system. Implicit in Professor 
LoPucki's concern is the assumption that the selected jurisdiction 
would resolve the tort dispute according to its own substantive law. 
But commonly accepted choice-of-law principles require the court that 
has jurisdiction over a case to apply the law that has the "most signifi­
cant relationship" to the alleged tort. 62 It is thus unlikely that a debtor 
could use a bankruptcy selection clause so as to change the substantive 
law by which its conduct would be judged. 
To be sure, the "norms" of the selected jurisdiction may be such 
that, even if the jurisdiction applied the more plaintiff-friendly sub­
stantive law of another jurisdiction, the final amount assigned to a tort 
victim's claim would be lower than if the claim had been litigated in 
the other jurisdiction.63 Even allowing for this possibility, however, it 
62 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (stating that 
court should apply law of the jurisdiction that has the "most significant relationship" to the 
alleged tort). 
63. For a discussion of the possible divergence between legal rules and the actual pre­
vailing legal culture, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in 
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is hard to ascertain why this divergence would drive the selection of a 
bankruptcy jurisdiction over all of the other factors that a firm would 
rationally consider. First, for it even to matter at the margin, the se­
lected jurisdiction would have to assign a sufficiently different value to 
the tort claims, such that the debtor would remain solvent where it 
otherwise would be insolvent; to the shareholders and the managers 
who represent their interests, being a little insolvent is the same as 
being a lot insolvent. Second, selecting a foreign regime makes a 
bankruptcy proceeding more expensive. If those in charge of the firm 
believed it would produce significant benefits, they would plausibly 
make such a selection. The off chance that the firm will incur substan­
tial tort liability, and that the selected jurisdiction will systematically 
undervalue the tort claims, however, simply does not seem to provide 
a large ex ante benefit. 
In sum, while there are easily identifiable efficiency gains in al­
lowing firms to select the jurisdiction that would handle any future in­
solvency proceeding, the cost of creating debtor havens is much more 
difficult to locate. Firms are more likely to choose the regime that 
best handles financial distress than they are to choose the one that 
best frustrates the claims of nonadjusting creditors. 
That firms will tend to select bankruptcy systems which minimize 
the cost of financial distress suggests that Professor Westbrook's 
dream of a single law administered by a single legal system may not be 
the ideal goal in international bankruptcy law. Though I initially en­
dorsed a multinational treaty that would establish bankruptcy proce­
dures from which firms could select, I now favor a system whereby 
firms select from the bankruptcy laws of the various countries. My 
change stems from concerns of institutional competence. I question 
the ability of any single group, no matter how well intentioned, to craft 
an ideal bankruptcy procedure. Moreover, it is unclear how respon­
sive such an institution would be to changes that were needed as the 
economy evolves. On balance, it may be that countries would find it 
in their interest to have their bankruptcy laws adopted by firms. For 
example, local attorneys would desire the business that a major bank­
ruptcy generates. To the extent that nations competed for bankruptcy 
business, and debtors selected their bankruptcy jurisdiction based on 
the jurisdiction's efficiency in handling financial distress, we could ex­
pect nations to produce more effective bankruptcy laws. Such laws, of 
course, may be far from perfect. The claim here is only that they 
would be better than those produced by any other institution. A re­
gime of bankruptcy selection clauses thus might not only allow firms 
to select the best of current law, but also would lead to a general in­
crease in the quality of extant law. 
Lawyers' Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498 (1996). Of course, it may be that the selected ju­
risdiction has norms that generate a higher amount. 
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III. FRUSTRATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 
One problem confronting both the universalist and the bankruptcy 
selection scholars is that their claims rest on efficiency, and domestic 
bankruptcy law clearly is not driven solely by a concern with effi­
ciency. To be sure, differences among various countries' domestic 
bankruptcy laws do not necessarily imply that these countries embrace 
differing goals. Rather, these differences may be explained as a dis­
agreement over which procedure best promotes efficiency. Indeed, 
there is a robust debate in the academic literature over which set of 
rules would best promote efficiency.64 Given this lack of academic 
consensus, it is no surprise that countries have not decided which set 
of bankruptcy rules promises to maximize firm value. 
These disagreements over implementing the efficiency norm 
should not affect the selection of a transnational bankruptcy rule. In a 
territorial regime, each country supplies its own solution. In a univer­
salist regime, one country's law will govern, but the other countries 
have no basis for complaining - their law will govern in other situa­
tions, and in all cases the law applied will be attempting to achieve the 
same goal.65 Indeed, to the extent that the different laws are just dif­
ferent attempts to reach the same goals, countries could learn from the 
experiences of other nations and update their law accordingly. For 
example, Canada not too long ago revamped its insolvency law to 
move it closer to the insolvency law of the United States.66 Finally, in 
a bankruptcy selection regime, firms will select the law or laws that 
they believe are most efficient. Indeed, this regime best comports with 
the countries' goals of promoting efficiency. Thus, the mere fact that 
bankruptcy laws differ across nations is not a basis for rejecting the 
bankruptcy selection or even the universalist solutions to the problem 
of transnational insolvencies. 
But there are some situations where the governing legislature has 
sacrificed efficiency for another goal, usually that of redistribution. 
Everyone has their favorite example - workers in Mexico, fishermen 
in the United States, and so on. Territorialism undoubtedly respects 
these choices. If the United States government has decided to protect 
United States fishermen, the territorial regime respects this decision. 
The same holds true for workers in Mexico. 
64. See sources cited in note 4. 
65. Cf Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 33944 (1990) 
(explaining how states can improve the advancement of their own policies through reciproc­
ity). 
66. For an argument that this revision departed from the goal of efficiency, see F.H. 
Buckley, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT 301, 306-08 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). 
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It may appear that either universalism or bankruptcy selection 
clauses would frustrate these noneconomic policy choices. On reflec­
tion, however, once a government has made a choice to favor a certain 
claimant, neither universalism nor contractual choice should stand as a 
barrier to that choice. To see why, it is important to recognize that 
bankruptcy regimes generally recognize property interests created by 
nonbankruptcy law. When a creditor gets a valid security interest in 
land under local law, that interest will be valid regardless of where a 
bankruptcy proceeding takes place. Thus, if a government believes 
that a certain creditor should be paid before all others, it can accom­
plish this goal by granting that creditor a valid security interest in the 
domestic assets of the firm. Failure to recognize such property rights 
would be grounds for a domestic court to ignore the edicts of a foreign 
jurisdiction under either a universalist or bankruptcy selection clause 
approach. 
That this mechanism would be effective is illustrated by its pres­
ence in American bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes 
and routinely enforces mechanics liens. These liens allow a creditor 
who enhances the value of a piece of the debtor's property to have a 
lien on that property. A holder of a mechanics lien can enforce that 
lien in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, by creating such a lien, the 
government has decided that that creditor should get paid first. Simi­
larly, if a government decides that its workers need special protection, 
it can create a lien to ensure that workers receive the wages that they 
are due. Indeed, the United States does precisely this in situations 
where workers have not been paid the minimum wage. Thus, to the 
extent that a government wishes to ensure that one class of claimants 
gets paid ahead of another, it has the means to effect this decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Transnational insolvencies raise issues of efficient resolution of fi­
nancial distress and fidelity to policy decisions made by various na­
tional legislatures and courts. The challenge for each country's do­
mestic bankruptcy law is to select a choice of law rule that best 
promotes efficiency and respects national choices. A regime of bank­
ruptcy selection clauses can harness the incentives of firms to maxi­
mize their value and, at the same time, can ensure that governmental 
decisions to protect favored groups are honored. As such, it provides 
the best means for resolving the insolvency problems raised by the in­
creasingly transnational nature of firms. 
